The increasing demands in security and reliability of infrastructures call for the optimal design of their embedded complex networks topologies. The following question then arises: what is the optimal layout to fulfill best all the demands? Here we present a general solution for this problem with scale-free networks, like the Internet and airline networks. Precisely, we disclose a way to systematically construct networks which are 100% robust against random failures as well as to malicious attacks. Furthermore, as the sizes of these networks increase, their shortest paths become asymptotically invariant and densities of links go to zero, making them ultra-small worlds and highly sparse, respectively. The first property is ideal for communication and navigation purposes, while the second is interesting economically.
The tremendous increase in complexity of infrastructural networks, like the Internet and those related with transportation and energy supply, is mandatorily accompanied by requirements of higher standards of system reliability, security and robustness. This trend can only be sustained if these complex networks have the right structure. Under this framework, the scale-free property present in many real networks determines important aspects related with their functionality [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] . However, while scale-free networks are usually quite robust against random failures, they typically break down rapidly under malicious attacks [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . Numerical studies have recently revealed that this weakness can be mitigated if their structure becomes onion-like, which means that nodes of equal degree are connected among each other and to nodes of higher degree [12, 13] . Since then, the properties of onion-like structures have been extensively investigated [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] . Based on this insight, here we will address the challenge of providing a paradigm for complex networks with better topology. More precisely, we show that it is possible to design a family of scale-free networks which are completely robust to random failures as well as to malicious attacks. Additionally, these networks also exhibit other improved properties, like a finite shortest path and extreme sparseness in the thermodynamic limit, which substantially increases communication and reduces costs. Thus these new networks become potential candidates for the design and implementation of complex infrastructural networks.
In the deterministic network model introduced here, the nodes belonging to a given shell have intra-shell and inter-shell connections, and the most connected nodes (hubs) are localized in the innermost shells. The network is recurrently expanded in such a way that every new generation corresponds to the addition of a new shell. Examples of these networks with four shells are shown in Figs. 1(a) and (b). Here we coin the name mandala network for this new family of graphs. In the first case, thereafter called network A, the first generation consists of a nucleus with three central nodes forming a complete graph (first shell). From each node in this nucleus, two new nodes emerge to form a connected ring of six nodes, composing the second shell of the second generation network. Following this iterative process, the third shell in the third generation network has an additional connected ring with twelve nodes, which, at this point, must also be linked to their respective ancestral nodes in the first and second shells. The same rules then apply for all new shells present in higher generation networks. This design therefore imposes that nodes at the same shell have the same degree. More precisely, the degree k ig of a node at the i-th shell in the g-th network generation is given by,
Defining n i as the number of nodes in the i-th shell, by construction, we have that n i+1 = 2n i . From this relation, the number of nodes in the network is given by N = g i=1 n i , where the summation is over the total number g of shells. In fact, the network described so far in Fig. 1(a) is a particular case resulting from the recursive method proposed here to generate an ensemble of ultra-robust networks. For example, in Fig. 1(b) we show another example of mandala network, thereafter named network B. Precisely, the method depends on a set of three parameters, (n 1 , b, λ), namely, the number of nodes in the first generation, n 1 , the number of new nodes added to each node in the more external shell, b, and the scale factor, λ, for node degree in successive generations. For instance, the networks A and B are completely defined by the sets (3, 2, 2) and (4, 4, 2), respectively.
Results Scale-free networks. Any network generated by this method has discrete degree spectra. In order to characterize the scale-free dependence, we consider the cumulative degree distribution,
Taking into account that in each shell all nodes have the same degree, the cumulative distribution can be written as, P (k ig ) = i j=1 n j /N . Applying Eq. (1) and the relation n j+1 = bn j , it can be shown that the cumulative distribution decays in the form, P (k ig ) ∼ 1/k ig . In Fig. 2 , we show a logarithmic plot of the cumulative degree distribution for networks A and B. In both cases, we have the same scale-free dependence. At this point, an explanation about the exponent of the degree distribution becomes necessary [24] [25] [26] . By definition of our network, the discrete degree distribution, p(k), can be described by, p(k ig ) ≡ n i /N , for a large number of shells. Considering that n i ∼ 2 i , we have p(k ig ) ∼ 1/k ig . Therefore, the cumulative and probability distributions scale in the same form. However, if we choose to work with binned intervals between consecutive degrees, the degree distribution is calculated as, p(k ig ) ≡ n i /N ∆k ig , where ∆k ig = k ig − k (i+1)g is the width of the interval. As ∆k ig ∼ k ig , it is possible to show that then p(
Ultra-small-world networks. Another important property of the mandala networks relates to the mean shortest path length ℓ = N ij ℓ ij / [N (N − 1)], where ℓ ij is the shortest distance between any two nodes i and j in the network, and the summation goes over all possible node pairs in the system. In our case, this expression can be written in a more convenient form as,
where φ j = N k=1 ℓ jk is the sum of the shortest path lengths connecting a node in the j-th shell with all other nodes in the network, n j is the number of nodes in the j-th shell, and the summation goes over the number of shells. Using the The solid line represents the least-squares fit to data in the scaling regions of a power law, P (k) ∼ k −β , with β = 1.00 ± 0.02, which confirms our analytical result.
symmetry of the network A, for example, it is possible to show that φ j = α j N + ξ j , where ξ j has different values for different shells, and α i is given by 5/3, 7/3, 5/2, 31/12, 63/24, for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively, so that α → 8/3, for i → ∞. Taking into account the linear dependence of φ j with N and considering the relations for n j , Eq. (2) reduces to
which leads to ℓ → 8/3 in the thermodynamic limit, N → ∞. We show in Fig. 3 a semi-log plot of the mean shortest path length as a function of the number of nodes. The asymptotic convergence confirms our analytical result and therefore indicates that our network has an ultra-small-world behavior, namely ℓ becomes independent of N . One should note, however, that this result is still different from the case of a complete graph, for which ℓ = 1, corresponding to the mean-field limit. Applying a similar sequence of calculations to the network B, it can be readily shown that the mean shortest path length for this topology also converges to a constant in the limit of large system sizes, but now equal to 11/4. Highly sparse graphs. Next, we define the density d of connections as the ratio between the number of existing connections and the maximal number of possible connections for an undirected network with N nodes, N (N − 1) ]. Considering the expression for k ig given by Eq. (1), we can rewrite the definition of d in the following way:
Expressing both summations in Eq. (4) in terms of the number of nodes in the network, N = g i n i , and considering the limit of a very large number of generations, we obtain,
The inset of Fig. 3 shows the dependence of the density of connections on the number of nodes for networks of type A, confirming the asymptotic behavior predicted by Eq. (5). In the case of network B, where the number of new nodes generated is twice that of network A, the density of connections decays faster. Indeed, applying the same approach and considering b = 4, it is possible to show for network B that d ∼ (log N ) /N . As a consequence, we conclude that our networks, despite of their ultra-small-world property, are extremely sparse when compared to the behavior of a complete graph, d = 1, and has only logarithmic correction to d ∼ 1/N that is valid for the Erdös-Rényi network at the percolation threshold. Ultra-robust graphs. The framework of percolation is usually considered for the analysis of the robustness of complex networks [7, 22, [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] . In this context, robustness is typically quantified by the critical fraction q c of removed nodes that leads to a total collapse of the network [6, 9, 10, 12] . Nevertheless, as previously reported [12] [13] [14] 16] , this approach does not account for situations in which the system can suffer a big damage without breaking down completely. The size of the giant component during the removal process of nodes has been recently introduced [12] as a new measure to robustness,
where s is the fraction of nodes belonging to the giant component after removing Q = qN nodes, q is the fraction of nodes removed, and R is in the range [0, 1/2]. The limit R = 0 corresponds to a system of isolated nodes, while R = 1/2 to the most robust network, which is the case, for example, of a completely connected graph. Here we check the robustness of our complex network model when subjected to both mechanisms of malicious and random attacks [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] .
Considering that the targets of malicious attacks are the surviving nodes with highest degree, in our network model, the process starts by selecting one of the nodes of the first shell. The deletion of such node will not cause the removal of other nodes, since any node in any shell has links to nodes in the previous and subsequent shells. Thus, the number of nodes of the giant component decreases only by one. The same occurs until all nodes in the first shell are erased. The attacks are then directed to the nodes in the second shell, but again all nodes in the second shell are connected to nodes in the next shells, so that the same argument applies. Thus, it follows that, s = 1 − q, which is valid up to the point when the remaining nodes are located in the last shell. This behavior is confirmed by results of numerical simulations shown in the main plot of Fig. 4 (dashed line) , regardless of the size and the type A or B of the network. It shows further that the integrity of the giant component is maintained up to nearly its total breakdown for either malicious or random strategies of node removal. Interestingly, the results in Fig. 4 also indicate that random attacks are generally more efficient than malicious ones.
From the behavior of s and Eq. (6), the robustness R to malicious attacks can be calculated as,
(N − i)/(N + 1) = (2N + 1)/2N . As shown in the inset of Fig. 4 , R converges asymptotically towards the maximum value, R max = 1/2, as expected for the case of malicious attacks to sufficiently large networks A and B. Mandala networks of different types and sizes also behave similarly when subjected to random attacks. Nevertheless, even for random failures, the level of robustness for our networks is superior when compared to other networks [12] , with R ≈ 0.45 for type A, and R ≈ 0.43, for type B.
The Ising model. In small-world networks, the fact that the diameter of the graph does not grow faster than log N implies an infinite dimension. Mean-field theories therefore can successfully describe their critical behavior [1, [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] . In order to investigate how collective ordering emerges in mandala networks, for which the shortest-path length is independent on N , we consider Ising spins σ i associated to their nodes and ferromagnetic interactions J between them on the edges. Adopting the reduced Hamiltonian, H/k b T = −J ij σ i σ j , we perform Monte Carlo (MC) simulations on networks of type A for different system sizes N and temperature T values. In particular, we analyse the finite-size scaling properties of the model at the critical temperature. The results in Fig. 5 show that the log N (red stars). The solid lines are the best fits to the numerically generated data sets, confirming these predicted behaviors. Hence both networks are highly sparse.
divergence of the finite-size critical temperature with N , measured from the peak of the susceptibility, has the form, T c (N ) ∼ N 1/ν , with a critical exponent, 1/ν = 0.50 ± 0.01. Discussion In summary, we have presented a recursive method to generate an ensemble of ultra-robust networks defined by a set of three parameters, namely (n 1 , b, λ). We have shown that the networks originated from our model have scalefree topologies and are ultra-robust either against malicious attacks or random failures of nodes. From analytical calculations confirmed through numerical simulation results, we have demonstrated that these networks are also ultra-small, i.e., the average shortest-path lengths of sufficiently large networks become independent of their number of nodes. Surprisingly, our results also show that, as compared to a complete graph, which is also ultra-small and ultra-robust, these networks are highly sparse, with the density of edges going to zero with system size. Finally, we have verified that the critical temperature of the Ising model on the mandala network topology diverges with system size according to a power-law dependence, described by an exponent 1/ν = 0.50 ± 0.01. We expect to generalize this last result to other universality classes, for example, considering directed percolation and self-organized models on our deterministic networks. of nodes belonging to the spanning cluster as a function of the fraction of removed nodes q, for malicious attacks targeted by degree (dashed line) and random removals (symbols) of nodes. In the case of malicious attacks, an identical behavior is observed for sufficiently large networks, s = 1−q, regardless of the type (A or B) of the network used in the calculations. In the random-attack case, our results exhibit high robustness for both A and B networks, that are also shown to be practically independent of the network size for the different numbers of nodes N considered. The inset shows the robustness measure R as a function of N for networks A and B subjected to malicious attacks targeted by degree (open symbols) as well as random failures (closed symbols). An asymptotic convergence towards the maximum robustness value, Rmax = 1/2, is observed for the case of malicious attacks, regardless of the network type. Both networks are less resilient to random attacks than to targeted ones, but still rather robust as compared to other models and real networks [12] , with R ≈ 0.45 and 0.43, for types A and B, respectively.
The Ising model. The Monte Carlo simulations of the Ising model on the mandala networks were performed using the Metropolis algorithm, starting from different initial spin configurations. In order to study the critical behavior of the system, we considered the magnetization M L and the susceptibility χ L , which are defined by M N (T ) = m time sample ,
χ N (T ) = N m 
where m = | averages taken over 100 independent samples. Time is measured in Monte Carlo steps (MCS), and 1 MCS corresponds to N attempts of changing the states of the spins. In our simulations, the initial 10 5 MCS were utilized to guarantee the system reached the steady state, after which the time averages were estimated using the next 6 × 10 5 MCS.The value of temperature where χ N has a maximum is identified as T c (N ) for N = 172, 684, 2732, 10924, 43692, and 174764.
